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Given the intention of section 7(a) of the Companies Act 71 of 2008 
(the Act) to promote compliance with the Bill of Rights in the 
interpretation and application of company law in SA, this article 
assesses the extent to which the Act actually does this. The article 
thus seeks to showcase evidence of the Act's intentional alignment 
with the normative framework of the Constitution of the Republic 
of South Africa, 1996 (the Constitution). The paper does this by 
answering the question: what are the implications of the 
Constitution's normative framework on the interpretation and 
application of the Act? The term "normative framework" is defined,  
and a distinction is drawn between the descriptive and explanatory  
social science research questions and the legal research 
questions which are evaluative and normative in nature. The article 
provides examples of the contexts in which the intentional 
alignment of the Act with the Constitution's normative framework 
is evident. To this extent, commentary is made on the following 
selected issues: remedies to facilitate the realisat ion and 
enjoyment of rights established by company law; the direct and 
indirect horizontal application of the Bill of Rights to provisions of 
the Act; and a discernible court's duty to develop the common law 
as necessary to improve the realisation of the rights established by 
the Act. A point is made in the article that judicial decisions 
involving the application of company law must be justified by 
reference to a cohesive set of values from the Bill of Rights. This  
is part of transformative constitutionalism. It demands that even 
commercial law principles should no longer be blindly accepted 
simply because precedent says so, or for the reason that it is 
expedient for the purposes of commercial certainty. The article 
argues that the Act permits the direct horizontal application of the 
Bill of Rights on its provisions in two stated ways. It is also argued 
that the Act permits the indirect application of the Bill of Rights 
through the development of the common law where it is deficient  
in promoting the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights. The 
development of the common law, it is argued, is vital for producing 
an incremental and cohesive body of constitutionalised common 
law in the company law context. 
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1 Introduction 
The Companies Act 71 of 2008 (hereafter, the Act) makes clear its intention 
to be aligned to overarching constitutional values in the interpretation and 
application of its provisions. The Act sets as one of its many purposes the 
promotion of "compliance with the Bill of Rights as provided for in the 
Constitution"1 in the interpretation and application of company law.2 While 
the now repealed Companies Act 61 of 1973 (hereafter the 1973 Act) was 
not intentionally harmonised with constitutional values, judging by its 
provisions, the current Act is. Evolving South African case law 
acknowledges that the Act must be interpreted in such a way that ensures 
that the founding values of the Constitution are advanced.3 In a number of 
recent cases the courts have confirmed that the interpretation of provisions 
of the Act has to comply with the normative framework of the Constitution. 
For example, in Lazarus Mbethe v United Manganese of Kalahari (hereafter 
Lazarus Mbethe 2017)4 the court affirmed the position that "compliance with 
the Bill of Rights" inter alia has "to be considered when interpreting the Act".5 
In Mouritzen v Greystones Enterprises (Pty) Ltd6 (hereafter Mouritzen) the 
court recognised that the Act7 seeks to enforce rights of litigants such as the 
right to access to information.8  
The question that this article attempts to answer is: what are the implications 
of the Constitution's normative framework9 on the interpretation and 
application of the Act? This question presupposes two other questions. The 
                                                 
* Brighton M Mupangavanhu. PhD Commercial Law (UCT); LLM Environmental Law 
(Natal); LLB (UFH). Senior Lecturer, University of the Western Cape, South Africa. 
E-mail: bmupangavanhu@uwc.ac.za. 
1  This is the first among the listed twelve purposes of the Companies Act 71 of 2008 
(the Act) in s 7. See s 7(a) of the Act. 
2  Reference to "Constitution" in this article is reference to Constitution of the Republic 
of South Africa, 1996, unless otherwise specified. 
3  See Nedbank Ltd v Bidvest 153 (Pty) Ltd 2012 5 SA 497 (WCC). 
4  Lazarus Mbethe v United Manganese of Kalahari 2017 ZASCA 67 (30 May 2017) 
(Lazarus Mbethe 2017) para 12. 
5  Also see Nedbank Ltd v Bidvest 153 (Pty) Ltd 2012 5 SA 497 (WCC) for the assertion 
that courts are charged with the duty to interpret the Act in such a manner that the 
founding values of the Constitution are respected and advanced.  
6  Mouritzen v Greystones Enterprises (Pty) Ltd 2012 5 SA 74 (KZD) (Mouritzen). 
7  In line with the principle of transparency in the management and governance of 
companies. 
8  Mouritzen para 21. The right that the court was specifically referring to in this part of 
the case was the right to access to company records, financial statements or related 
information held by "any person who holds or has a beneficial interest in any 
securities issued by a company …" This right is provided for in s 26 of the Act. S 
26(7)(a) states that the "rights of access to information set out in this section are in 
addition to, and not in substitution for, any rights a person may have to access 
information in terms of section 32 of the Constitution." 
9  See section 2 below for the meaning of the phrase "normative framework". 
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first is: how is the Act to be interpreted? The second question is: what is the 
framework of standards used to evaluate the correctness of an 
interpretation of provisions of the Act? This article thus proposes to provide 
a commentary on the impact that the Constitution has had thus far, should 
have and will have in the future, on the interpretation and application of 
provisions of the Act. The article seeks to showcase evidence of the Act's 
intentional alignment with the Constitution's normative framework. It is not, 
however, proposed that this article will comment on all available evidence 
of the Act's alignment with the Constitution. The article will also briefly 
highlight what the Act itself says about the method to be used for interpreting 
its provisions.10 It will be vital in this article to provide examples of the 
contexts in which the intentional alignment of the Act with the Constitution's 
normative framework is evident. To this extent, the article provides 
commentary on the following selected issues: remedies to facilitate the 
realisation and enjoyment of rights established by company law; the direct 
and indirect horizontal application of the Bill of Rights to provisions of the 
Act; and a discernible court's duty to develop the common law as necessary 
to improve the realisation of the rights established by the Act.11  
One of the theses of this article is that the Act, just like the Constitution, 
mandates courts to develop the common law as necessary in order to 
promote the enjoyment of the rights established by the Act. A related 
argument is that where a common law principle clearly clashes with public 
policy as represented by values which underlie the Bill of Rights, courts 
have an obligation to develop the common law as per their constitutional 
mandate. 
2 Normative framework of the Constitution and the Act12 
It is considered important as a foundation to briefly establish a working 
understanding of the term "normative framework" in legal research. While 
social science research questions are descriptive and explanatory13 in 
nature, legal research is said to attempt to answer evaluative and normative 
questions.14 Normative questions seek to provide answers which go beyond 
an explanation as to why the law is what it is. For example, a question that 
asks whether an interpretation of the Act's provisions is properly aligned to 
                                                 
10  As stated in s 5(1) of the Act. 
11  See s 158(a) of the Act. 
12  The Companies Act 71 of 2008. 
13  It is said that the theoretical framework provides the support for a descriptive or 
explanatory question, advancing possible explanations or causes that need to be 
investigated in empirical work. It has been said that in legal research doing empirical 
work, in the sense of gathering data about social reality, is not the common 
approach. See Taekema 2018 Law and Method 1.  
14  Taekema 2018 Law and Method 3. 
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the section 39(2) objectives of the Constitution is an evaluative question.15 
The alignment of the interpretation of the provisions of any legislation with 
the "spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights" is the objective which 
section 39(2) of the Constitution seeks to attain. An evaluative question 
needs to be answered on the basis of overarching standards against which 
a legal system or rather a law can be assessed. For the reason that legal 
research questions are evaluative and normative, they require a normative 
framework. Unlike in the social sciences, where an explanatory framework 
may be appropriate, in legal research a normative framework is relevant to 
providing a justification for a judgment as to why the law is good or bad in 
context.16 The normative framework to be utilised in interpreting the 
provisions of the Act is easy to identify through the purposes which the Act 
seeks to achieve.17  
Section 3 below deals with the role of the normative framework in the 
interpretation and application of the provisions of the Act. 
3 Interpretation of the Act 
In Natal Joint Municipal Pension Fund v Endumeni Municipality,18 Wallis JA 
of the Supreme Court of Appeal (SCA) gave a fitting definition of 
interpretation as follows:  
Interpretation is the process of attributing meaning to the words used in a 
document, be it legislation, some other statutory instrument, or contract, 
having regard to the context provided by reading the particular provision or 
provisions in the light of the document as a whole and the circumstances 
attendant upon its coming into existence. Whatever the nature of the 
document, consideration must be given to the language used in the light of 
the ordinary rules of grammar and syntax; the context in which the provision 
appears; the apparent purpose to which it is directed and the material known 
to those responsible for its production. Where more than one meaning is 
possible each possibility must be weighed in the light of all these factors. The 
process is objective, not subjective. 
The Act provides for its provisions to be interpreted and applied in a manner 
which reflects the views expressed by Wallis JA. It provides that the 
interpretation and application of the provisions of the Act must be done in a 
manner that gives effect to the purposes set out in section 7.19 Of greater 
relevance to this article is the first purpose in section 7, in which the Act 
                                                 
15  Section 39(2) of the Constitution states that "When interpreting any legislation, and 
when developing the common law or customary law, every court, tribunal or forum 
must promote the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights". 
16  Taekema 2018 Law and Method 13. 
17  See s 7 of the Act. 
18  Natal Joint Municipal Pension Fund v Endumeni Municipality 2012 4 SA 593 (SCA) 
para 18. 
19  See s 5(1) of the Act. 
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seeks to promote compliance with the Bill of Rights in the interpretation 
process.20 According to Mupangavanhu,21 while the 1973 Act was not 
harmonised with constitutional values for the reason that it predated the 
constitutional era, the current Act (the Companies Act 2008) has to be 
aligned to the constitutional founding values.22 It is necessary to unpack 
what is meant by the requirement to promote compliance with the Bill of 
Rights in the interpretation of the Act, as per section 7(a). What does it 
mean, exactly? Is it even possible for a court to give effect to all the rights 
contained in the Bill of Rights in a given case? Quite clearly, this is not 
possible. Clarifying the exact meaning of this purpose of the Act is vital.  
It can be discerned that section 7(a) appears to echo the call in section 39(2) 
of the Constitution for the court and any other adjudicating tribunal to have 
regard to what is referred to in this interpretation clause as "the spirit, purport 
and objects of the Bill of Rights" during statutory interpretation. The phrase 
"spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights" itself also requires decoding. 
While the phrase is catchy and interesting, its true import may not be 
obvious. Below, the author attempts to give meaning to the phrase while 
establishing what the Act means by the purpose of promoting compliance 
with the Bill of Rights in the application of company law. The answer is to 
be found in providing meaning to the phrases "spirit, purport and objects of 
the Bill of Rights"23 and the phrase "spirit, purposes and objects of this Act" 
as employed by the Act.24 This article will show how these two phrases 
create a generic normative framework for statutory interpretation in South 
Africa and a subordinate normative framework for the Act itself.  
3.1 Promoting the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights 
Section 39(2) is South Africa's statutory interpretation clause.25 This clause 
applies to interpretation of the Bill of Rights and is relevant "when 
interpreting any legislation, and when developing the common law or 
customary law". Courts of law, any tribunal or forum that interprets and 
applies legislation when settling disputes brought before it by litigants 
should seek to achieve the objectives of section 39(2). In interpreting the 
Act and applying company law, the objectives of section 39(2) find 
expression through the purpose to "promote compliance with the Bill of 
                                                 
20  See s 7(a) of the Act. 
21  Mupangavanhu 2017 Speculum Juris 197. 
22  The founding values of the Constitution are to be found in s 1. These values include 
inter alia: human dignity, the achievement of equality and the advancement of human 
rights and freedoms; non-racialism and non-sexism; the supremacy of the 
Constitution and the rule of law.  
23  See s 39(2) of the Constitution. 
24  See s 158(b)(i) of the Act. 
25  See Botha Statutory Interpretation 101. 
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Rights as provided for in the Constitution in the application of company 
law."26  
Case law supports the argument in this article that section 39(2) provides 
the general normative framework for the interpretation and application of 
provisions of the Act, and indeed any legislation. The Constitutional Court 
confirmed this in Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Environmental 
Affairs and Tourism,27 where Ngcobo J remarked that section 39(2) provides 
"the starting point in interpreting any legislation"28 in South Africa. It is 
important to note that section 39(2) employs a peremptory word "must" 
when referring to how courts or tribunals are to do statutory interpretation. 
It has been argued that whether a provision in a statute appears clear and 
unambiguous or not, the section 39(2) mandate finds application and must 
be fulfilled.29 Where the Bill of Rights imposes an obligation, as is the case 
with section 39(2), such a constitutional obligation must be performed 
diligently and without delay.30  
The best way to fulfil the mandate in section 39(2) is to ensure that the 
adjudication of disputes and the interpretation of statutes is done "through 
the prism of the Bill of Rights", as held in case law.31 It is not only case law 
that provides so. The Bill of Rights itself clearly provides that it applies to 
"all law" and binds the legislature, the executive, the judiciary and all organs 
of state.32 This implies that courts must be alive to the section 39(2) 
objectives and to their mandate in this regard before and during the process 
of interpreting statutory provisions. The interpretation must thus be informed 
by or done through the lens of the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of 
Rights,33 and this should illuminate the entire statutory interpretation 
process. In other words, what is required is a "teleological" interpretation of 
the provisions of the Act. This is a type of interpretation where constitutional 
values as represented by section 39(2) provide a normative value system34 
(a context) against which all law, all actions, including decision-making 
                                                 
26  Section 7(a) of the Act. 
27  Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism  2004 4 
SA 490 (CC). 
28  See Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism  2004 
4 SA 490 (CC) paras 70, 80 and 90. 
29  Mupangavanhu Directors' Standards of Care 199.  
30  See s 237 of the Constitution, which provides that "all constitutional obligations must 
be performed diligently and without delay."  
31  See the remarks by Langa DP in Investigating Directorate: Serious Offences v 
Hyundai Motor Distributors (Pty) Ltd: In re Hyundai Motor Distributors (Pty) Ltd v 
Smit 2001 1 SA 545 (CC) para 21. 
32  See s 8(1) of the Constitution. 
33  For a similar view, see Maswazi 2017 De Rebus 28.  
34  Note that even retired Deputy Chief Justice Digkang Moseneke refers to a 
"normative value system" provided by the Constitution through s 39(2). See 
Moseneke 2007 Speculum Juris 2. 
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processes are to be measured and evaluated.35 Thus, the Constitution is 
said to have changed the context of all legal thought and decision-making 
in South Africa through section 39(2).36 Now decision-making by judges 
"can only be done by reference to a system of values … a cohesive set of 
values, ideal to an open and democratic society."37  
The point needs to be emphasised that the normative value-laden 
framework provided by section 39(2) does not become relevant only when 
the interpretation involves a clear right provided in the Bill of Rights. Some 
courts seem to understand that section 39(2) is relevant only to the 
interpretation and application of the Bill of Rights. In the very recent Makate 
v Vodacom Ltd38 case, the Constitutional Court correctly observed that "the 
Constitution in plain terms mandates courts to invoke section 39(2) when 
discharging their judicial function of interpreting legislation."39 The court 
remarked that this duty is "triggered as soon as the provision under 
interpretation affects the rights in the Bill of Rights."40 The duty is triggered 
not only in cases of the interpretation of the provisions of the Bill of Rights, 
but in every instance where the overarching or normative standards of the 
Bill of Rights are implicated. The time has come for the Constitutional Court 
to lay down a criterion or rather confirm the status of the normative value -
laden framework which section 39(2) should provide to statutory 
interpretation in South Africa. Some courts including the SCA seem to be 
unsure as to when section 39(2) is relevant as an interpretation clause.41 A 
proper reading of section 39(2) should reveal that section 39(2) is relevant 
even when the matter to be decided by the court, tribunal or any forum is 
not purely a right in the Bill of Rights – since section 8(1) of the Constitution, 
as already observed, provides that the Bill of Rights applies to "all law". This 
duty falls upon the court whenever it has a task of adjudication, which 
process involves statutory interpretation and whenever the court has a duty 
to develop the common law or customary law. Every judge of a court in 
                                                 
35  See Mupangavanhu Directors' Standards of Care 197. Also see Botha Statutory 
Interpretation 108. 
36  See Holomisa v Argus Newspapers Ltd 1996 2 SA 588 (W) 618. 
37  This important remark was made by Mokgoro J in her concurring judgment (to the 
judgment of Chaskalson P) in the famous case of S v Makwanyane 1995 3 SA 391 
(CC) para 302. 
38  Makate v Vodacom Ltd 2016 4 SA 121 (CC). 
39  Makate v Vodacom Ltd 2016 4 SA 121 (CC) para 90. 
40  Makate v Vodacom Ltd 2016 4 SA 121 (CC) para 90. 
41  In a number of cases, it seems as if the SCA has carefully avoided giving clear 
guidance on the role of s 39(2) when deciding on the constitutionality of some 
provisions of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 (CPA) such as s 49. In S v 
Walters 2001 10 BCLR 1088 (Tk) the SCA overruled a precedent in Govender v 
Minister of Safety and Security 2001 4 SA 273 (SCA) without commenting on the 
very relevant s 39(2). In Minister of Safety and Security v Sekhoto 2011 5 SA 367 
(SCA) the SCA seemed unsure of how s 40 of the CPA was to be interpreted in order 
to promote the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights. 
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South Africa, when taking an oath of office, is required to swear/affirm that 
he/she "will uphold and protect the Constitution and the human rights 
entrenched in it ... "42 A judge is also expected to commit to administering 
justice to "all persons alike without fear, favour or prejudice, in accordance 
with the Constitution and the law."43 In other words the outcome of an 
adjudication process should be a product of the infusion of values which 
underlie "an open and democratic society based on freedom, human dignity 
and equality" into decision-making.44  
In this constitutional dispensation, it has been argued, judges are no longer 
only referees whose task during statutory interpretation is limited to a "mere 
mechanical reiteration of what was supposedly intended by Parliament as 
was the case during the days of parliamentary sovereignty."45 What section 
39(2) in fact requires of courts as custodians of the Constitution is to 
demonstrate awareness that the subsection is shot through with 
overarching normative standards which impose an obligation on judges as 
decision-makers to apply such values during decision-making and the 
interpretation process.46 Thus, it must be reiterated, statutory interpretation 
should begin with section 39(2) – as a starting point.47 Even before 
beginning the interpretation process, a judge must be alert to the values 
expressed in the Bill of Rights and must allow him/herself to be informed by 
the power of the founding values of the Constitution.48 Judges are thus 
expected to ensure that the final outcome of the adjudication process and 
statutory interpretation bears evidence that the process has been imbued 
with the normative framework of values as represented by section 39(2) of 
the Constitution and as reflected in section 7(a) of the Act.49  
                                                 
42  See Schedule 2 item 6(1) of the Constitution.  
43  See Schedule 2 item 6(1) of the Constitution. 
44  See the phrase employed in s 36(1) of the Constitution. The values referred to in this 
section are core values on which the Constitution rests – see s 1 of the Constitution.  
45  See Botha Statutory Interpretation 108. Also see Mupangavanhu Directors' 
Standards of Care 197-199. 
46  In this regard, the warning in s 237 of the Constitution that all constitutional 
obligations must be performed diligently and without delay must be carefully heeded.  
47  See Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism 2004 
4 SA 490 (CC) para 72. Also see paras 80 and 90. 
48  See Holomisa v Argus Newspapers Ltd 1996 2 SA 588 (W) 618. 
49  For the foundational principles, see s 1 of the Constitution.  
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3.2 Spirit, purposes and objects of the Act 
In a manner reminiscent of section 39(2) of the Constitution, section 158(b) 
of the Act mandates the commission,50 panel,51 tribunal52 or court to 
"promote the spirit, purposes and objects of this Act."53 This must be done 
whenever these forums have an occasion to determine a matter brought 
before them or when making a relevant order. This refers to the adjudication 
and interpretation processes involving provisions of the Act. As already 
observed, section 158(b)(i) is part of what has been described as a specific 
normative framework for interpretation of the Act, which is subordinate to 
the generic normative framework established by section 39(2) of the 
Constitution. Reading section 158(b)(i) together with the Act's purpose to 
promote compliance with the Bill of Rights provided for in section 7(a) leaves 
no doubt that the Act is intentionally aligned to the section 39(2) objectives. 
The aim is to infuse statutory interpretation and the development of common 
law with the foundational values of the Constitution. For this reason, the 
Act54 requires adjudicating forums55 to interpret and apply its provisions in 
a manner that promotes "the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights" 
as well as that promotes "the spirit, purposes and objects" of the Act.  
The "spirit, purposes and objects" of the Act imply the "context" in which the 
provisions of the Act must be understood and applied. This has been 
correctly understood to mean the text-in-context approach or a purposive 
approach to the interpretation of the provisions of the Act.56 This is 
distinguishable from the time-honoured and now out-dated orthodox text-
based/literal approach. In terms of the text-based approach, the interpreter 
concentrates on the literal meaning of the provision to be interpreted.57 The 
primary rule in statutory interpretation is that if the meaning of the text is 
clear, such a plain meaning, it is said, should be applied and it is equated 
with the intention of the legislature.58 The golden rule59 is that courts can 
                                                 
50  The reference to the "Commission" is a reference to the Companies and Intellectual 
Property Commission, also known under the acronym CIPC. The Companies 
Commission or simply the Commission's role includes the enforcement of the Act, 
ensuring compliance with the Act, and administering investigations of complaints. 
This is in keeping with the system of administrative enforcement of the Act driven by 
the Commission. See ss 186(d)-(e) of the Act for the main goals of the Commission.  
51  According to s 1 of the Act, "Panel" means the Takeover Regulation Panel 
established in terms of s 196.  
52  "Tribunal", as per s 1 refers to the "Companies Tribunal" established in terms of s 
193 of the Act. 
53  See s 158(b)(i) of the Act.  
54  See s 5(1) of the Act. 
55  This includes the court and other forums. 
56  Mupangavanhu Directors' Standards of Care 194.  
57  Botha Statutory Interpretation 91. 
58  See Principal Immigration Officer v Hawabu 1936 AD 26. 
59  Botha Statutory Interpretation 91.  
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deviate from the text only where there is ambiguity in words.60 Will the 
golden rule apply to the interpretation of the Act? The Act appears clear on 
this. The application of the golden rule is not unqualified. Interpretation 
should seek to advance the spirit, purposes and objects of the Act.61 If any 
provision of the Act, read in its context, can be reasonably construed to have 
more than one meaning, the meaning that best promotes the spirit, purport 
and objects of the Act must be preferred – that is, a contextual 
interpretation.62 Thus, the provisions of the Act are not to be interpreted in 
isolation but in the context of the entire Act as guided by its objects (the 
entire legislative scheme approach). In the words of Schreiner JA, context 
is:  
… not limited to the language of the rest of the statute regarded as throwing 
light of a dictionary kind on the part to be interpreted. Often of more importance 
is the matter of the statute, its apparent scope and purpose, and, within limits, 
its background.63  
The context of the Act includes the history of the legislation;64 the common 
law prior to the enactment of the Act;65 law reform or policy objectives; 
defects in the law not provided for by the common law, and new remedies 
provided for in the Act.66  
                                                 
60  See Public Carriers Association v Toll Road Concessionaries (Pty) Ltd 1990 1 SA 
925 (A) paras 943C-H. 
61  As per s 158(b)(i) of the Act. 
62  Section 158(b)(ii) of the Act. 
63  Jaga v Donges; Bhana Donges 1950 4 SA 653 (A) 662.  
64  The Companies Act 61 of 1973 (the 1973 Act) had been amended 42 times in its 37 
years of existence. It was now out of alignment with important national and global 
developments and some of its concepts were becoming archaic in a rapidly  
transforming world of business and regulation. See Cassim et al. Contemporary 
Company Law 3-5. 
65  Some common law positions were unclear and the common law needed to be 
developed in keeping with changes at national and international level. For example,  
some issues regarding concepts such as piercing the veil at common law and the 
turquand rule needed to be clarified and to be brought in sync with international 
developments as well as with the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights as 
provided for in s 7(a) of the Act. 
66  The Act has made various interventions with regard to providing means to improve 
remedies in order to promote the realisation of the rights of parties who approach 
the Act with the aim of enforcing their rights. For example s 157 has the title 
"Extended standing to apply for remedies"; s 158 provides for "Remedies to promote 
purposes of the Act"; s 161 provides for "Application to protect rights of securities 
holders"; s 163 provides for "Relief from oppressive or prejudicial conduct or from 
abuse of separate juristic personality of a company", and s 164 makes provision for 
"Dissenting shareholders' appraisal rights", inter alia.  
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3.3 Transformative constitutionalism – changing the legal culture of 
interpretation 
For the purposes of adjudication and interpretation, I would define 
transformative constitutionalism as denoting the influence of the 
overarching values of the Constitution on the legal culture of interpretation 
to align it with the normative value system. As demonstrated above, the 
Act's mandate on the courts and other adjudicating forums to promote the 
spirit, purposes and objects of the Act67 is an expression of the intent to 
align interpretation with the generic normative framework. It is hereby 
observed that while the ideal of a normative framework based on the 
founding values of the Constitution and aligning interpretation to such an 
ideal remains a possibility, making the ideal a reality still requires concerted 
efforts. Probably the biggest impediment to realising the dream of 
interpreting the provisions of any legislation68 through the prism of the Bill 
of Rights is the stubborn legal culture.  
In Karl Klare's words, one of the biggest challenges to transformative 
constitutionalism69 is "the inherent conservatism of South African legal 
culture."70 Conservatism in Klare's perspective denotes a formalistic or 
technical approach to law.71 Legal culture in this sense can be understood 
to mean "the professional sensibilities, habits of mind and intellectual 
reflexes of lawyers or those ingrained ideas about how the law works and 
what arguments are and are not convincing."72 A formalistic approach to law 
thus entrenches mind-sets73 which condition law users to blindly 
accept/follow certain legal principles as they are without question, because 
of the existence of authority or precedent.74 The late Chief Justice Langa 
intimated, and correctly so in my view, that private and commercial law 
seem not to easily lend themselves to transformation75 and can thus be 
considered to be conservative. Judge Langa bemoaned the fact that this 
branch of law traditionally teaches law students and rewards them for the 
"rational deduction of inevitable conclusions from unquestionable 
                                                 
67  When determining a matter brought before them, courts are required to promote the 
spirit, purposes and objects of the Act. See s 158(b)(i) of the Act.  
68  Especially legislation of a private or commercial law nature.  
69  As complex as "transformative constitutionalism" is to define, Klare defines it to mean 
"a long term project of constitutional enactment, interpretation, and enforcement 
committed (not in isolation, of course, but in historical context of conducive political 
developments) to transforming a country's political and social institutions and power 
relationships in a democratic, participatory, and egalitarian direction." Klare 1998 
SAJHR 150. That is, admittedly, a complex definition.  
70  Klare 1998 SAJHR 146.  
71  Klare 1998 SAJHR 168. 
72  Langa 2006 Stell LR 356. 
73  In law students, lawyers and also in judges. 
74  Langa 2006 Stell LR 353.  
75  Langa 2006 Stell LR 355. 
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principles."76 He states that such a legal education is now out of step with 
the ideal of transformative constitutionalism and needs to be transformed if 
the constitutional dream is to be realised. Judge Langa thus emphatically 
adds:  
We can no longer teach the lawyers of tomorrow that they must blindly accept 
legal principles because of authority. No longer can we responsibly turn out 
law graduates who are unable to critically engage with the values of the 
Constitution and who are unwilling to implement those values in all corners of 
their practices. A truly transformative South Africa requires a new approach 
that places the Constitutional dream at the very heart of legal education. It 
requires that we regard law as part of the social fabric and teach law students 
to see it as such. They [the students as future lawyers] should see law for 
what it is, as an instrument that was used to oppress in the past, but that has 
that immense power and capacity to transform society.77  
Mureinik78 observed that transformative constitutionalism represents a true 
shift from apartheid's culture of authority to a post-apartheid culture of 
justification. A formalistic and conservative approach to law frustrates this 
goal of transformative constitutionalism. Formalism runs counter to the 
liberating legal tradition of analytical argument and critical thinking, which 
should result in substantive reasoning as opposed to formal legal reasoning. 
Judge Langa observes that under a transformative Constitution like South 
Africa's, now "judges bear the ultimate responsibility to justify their decisions 
not only by reference to authority [precedent], but by reference to ideas and 
values [a normative value system]".79 Formal legal reasoning unfortunately 
tends to discourage such an inquiry into the true motivation for judicial 
decisions and impedes on the discharge of the judicial responsibility to 
demonstrate that a decision is aligned with the overarching values of the 
Constitution as reflected in section 39(2).  
Transformative constitutionalism80 demands that even private and 
commercial law principles should no longer be blindly accepted simply 
because precedent says so, or for the reason that it is expedient for the 
purposes of commercial certainty. The exercise of public and private power 
which impinges on entrenched rights or which is inconsistent with the 
foundational principles of the Constitution81 "may very well attract 
constitutional consequences".82 In Du Plessis v De Klerk,83 a case decided 
                                                 
76  Langa 2006 Stell LR 355. 
77  Langa 2006 Stell LR 356. Words and emphasis added. 
78  Mureinik 1994 SAJHR 32. 
79  Langa 2006 Stell LR 353. Words and emphasis added. 
80  Which encompasses transformative adjudication. 
81  Principles such as the democratic values of human dignity, equality and freedom.  
82  Moseneke 2009 Stell LR 4-5. 
83  Du Plessis v De Klerk  1996 3 SA 859 (CC). 
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in terms of the interim Constitution,84 the majority ruling recognised that the 
Bill of Rights has horizontal application – that is, it applies albeit indirectly to 
purely private disputes. In other words, the court reckoned that the Bill of 
Rights should have an influence on the development of the common law as 
it governs horizontal relations.85 While that judgment acknowledged that 
fundamental rights would not directly found a claim against a private party, 
it held that the Bill of Rights would serve as a normative standard that would 
guide the adaptation of common law.86 I have deliberately chosen to cite Du 
Plessis v De Klerk in this regard for the reason that it demonstrates that the 
formalistic approach can be dangerous to constitutional interpretation. If the 
court had paid closer attention to section 7(1) and (2) of the interim 
Constitution,87 it may have found that direct horizontal application of the Bill 
of Rights was possible.88 Moseneke correctly argues that the rejection of 
direct horizontality89 is "at odds with the transformative project of the new 
democratic order with overt pursuit of human dignity and equality … ."90 
4 Evidence of the Act's alignment with the normative value 
system 
In section 3, I made the point that the Act demonstrates a commitment to 
be aligned with the generic normative value system established by the Bill 
of Rights91 and that it has a subordinate normative framework in sync with 
the generic framework.92 In section 4 this article endeavours to present 
evidence of the said intentional alignment. As promised in section 1, this 
section will briefly provide commentary on examples of evidence of the 
alignment. To this end, this section considers the remedies to facilitate the 
realisation and enjoyment of the rights established by company law; 
whether the Act permits indirect horizontal application of the Bill of Rights 
only or whether it also permits the direct horizontal application of the Bill of 
                                                 
84  Section 35(3) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 200 of 1993 (the 
interim Constitution).  
85  Du Plessis v De Klerk  1996 3 SA 859 (CC) para 62. 
86  Moseneke 2009 Stell LR 6. 
87  This is the equivalent of s 8(1) of the Constitution. 
88  The decision in Du Plessis v De Klerk  1996 3 SA 859 (CC) was correctly criticised 
for the reason that if there is no direct horizontal application of the Bill of Rights, a 
private party whose rights have been violated by another private party will be without  
effective remedy. See Woolman and Davis 1996 SAJHR 361.  
89  In a historically unequal society like SA where private individuals and institutions 
wield so much social and financial power vis-à-vis those disadvantaged and 
marginalised by colonialism and apartheid – per Moseneke's words.  
90  Moseneke 2009 Stell LR 7. 
91  See section 3.1. 
92  See section 3.2. 
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Rights. To a limited extent, this section considers a court's mandate to 
develop the common law. 
4.1 Remedies to promote the realisation and enjoyment of the rights 
established by the Act  
Section 158 is, as already stated in section 3.2, aptly entitled "Remedies to 
promote the purpose of the Act". Despite the title's referring to "purpose", it 
is surely meant to be read in the plural, namely as referring to "purposes". 
The sense conveyed by the section is that its purpose is to promote the 
enjoyment of the rights of parties as established by the Act. A court, a 
tribunal or any forum adjudicating on the basis of the Act or common law is 
required by this section to do three related things. Firstly, the courts are 
mandated to develop the common law as necessary in order to improve and 
facilitate the enjoyment of rights.93 Section 4.2 below will provide a succinct 
examination of this aspect. Secondly, the courts and other adjudicating 
forums are mandated to promote the spirit, purpose and objects of the Act 
during the adjudication process.94 In section 3.2 I have already attempted 
to provide meaning to the phrase "spirit, purpose and objects of the Act".95 
Thirdly, if provisions of the Act are found to be capable of more than one 
meaning, courts are required by the Act to prefer a meaning that best 
promotes the spirit, purpose(s) and objects of the Act, and an interpretation 
that best improves the realisation and enjoyment of rights.96  
Needless to say, every interpretation of any provision of a statute in South 
Africa has to be done through the "prism of the Bill of Rights"97 since the Bill 
of Rights applies to "all law".98 For the reason that the Bill of Rights can 
potentially bind natural or juristic persons,99 it applies in appropriate 
circumstances and to the extent possible, in the private sphere involving 
private individuals or juristic persons such as companies. Thus, the 
remedies to promote the realisation and enjoyment of rights in terms of the 
Act can easily assume a constitutional flavour. As already alluded to in this 
article,100 the Bill of Rights may have both direct and indirect horizontal 
                                                 
93  See s 158(a) of the Act. 
94  Section 158(b)(i) of the Act. See section 3.2.  
95  As provided in s 158(b) of the Act. 
96  See s 158(b)(ii) of the Act. 
97  See Investigating Directorate: Serious Offences v Hyundai Motor Distributors (Pty) 
Ltd: In re Hyundai Motor Distributors (Pty) Ltd v Smit 2001 1 SA 545 (CC) para 21. 
98  As clearly provided in s 8(1) of the Constitution.  
99  Section 8(2) of the Constitution provides that: "A provision of the Bill of Rights binds 
a natural or juristic person if, and to the extent that, it is applicable, taking into 
account the nature of the right and the nature of any duty imposed by the right ." 
100  See section 3.3. 
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application – that is, it applies to private disputes governed by private or 
corporate/company law.  
4.2 Direct or indirect horizontal application of the Bill of Rights on 
the Act? 
A question that seems natural to ask in the light of section 7(a) is whether 
the Act permits the direct or only the indirect horizontal application of the Bill 
of Rights on its provisions. In answering this question, it is important to note 
that the confusion regarding the direct and indirect application of the Bill of 
Rights in a private sphere under the interim Constitution has to a certain 
extent been resolved under the current Constitution. For example, in Du 
Plessis v De Klerk the Constitutional Court ruled that the entrenched 
fundamental rights in the interim Constitution did not have "general direct 
horizontal application" and could be invoked against an organ of state 
only.101 Impliedly, fundamental rights such as freedom of speech and of the 
press102 could not be invoked by one private party against another private 
party. As a general principle, this ruling can no longer be correct and is 
generally irrelevant under the current Constitution. Granted, there are 
certain rights under the Bill of Rights such as the socio-economic rights 
which the Constitution imposes on the state only. However, the current 
Constitution has now clarified that fundamental rights are no longer 
restricted to vertical application. Not only does the Bill of Rights under the 
Constitution apply to "all law", bind the legislature, the executive, the 
judiciary and organs of state,103 but it also binds natural as well as juristic 
persons.104 It can therefore be argued that the new constitutional order 
"does not limit its reach to the classical liberal divide between private and 
state action".105  
It appears in the light of its provisions in section 8(1) and 8(2) that the 
Constitution now permits direct horizontal application of the Bill of Rights to 
private disputes. A perfect example of this shift is to be seen in Khumalo v 
Holomisa,106 a case decided in terms of the present Constitution. Unlike in 
its decision in Du Plessis v De Klerk, the court in Khumalo v Holomisa 
decided that the right to freedom of expression is of direct horizontal 
application. Khumalo v Holomisa was the first case, and it has been said, 
the only case in which the Constitutional Court upheld a direct application 
                                                 
101  Du Plessis v De Klerk  1996 3 SA 859 (CC) para 62. 
102  Guaranteed by s 15 of the interim Constitution.  
103  See s 8(1) of the Constitution. 
104  Section 8(2) of the Constitution provides that: "A provision of the Bill of Rights binds 
a natural or a juristic person if, and to the extent that, it is applicable, taking into 
account the nature of the right and the nature of any duty imposed by the right ." 
105  Moseneke 2009 Stell LR 6 
106  Khumalo v Holomisa 2002 5 SA 401 (CC). 
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of a provision in the Bill of Rights to alter a common law rule.107 After this 
case, courts appear to have preferred indirect horizontal application of the 
Bill of Rights either to a challenged common law rule or a statute through 
the mechanism in section 39(2) of the Constitution. I will very briefly 
comment below on the direct and indirect application of the Bill of Rights on 
the Act. 
4.2.1 Direct horizontal application of the Bill of Rights on the Act  
In assessing whether or not the Act permits the direct application of the 
provisions of the Bill of Rights in the private sphere, it is important to bear in 
mind the caveat in section 8(2) of the Constitution, read together with 
section 8(1). The Bill of Rights, as already said, applies to "all law".108 The 
caveat is that the application of the Bill of Rights to natural and/or juristic 
persons is possible only if and to the extent that it is applicable, taking into 
account the nature of the right and any duty imposed.109 Thus, courts will 
not countenance the application of provisions of the Bill of Rights with 
reckless abandon despite the importance of transformative 
constitutionalism to the adjudication process. Direct horizontal application 
will be permitted only where this is relevant. Litigants (and their legal 
representatives) who seek to rely on the horizontal application of 
fundamental rights have a duty to effectively plead their cases before the 
courts. Judges have bemoaned the fact that litigants' reliance on 
constitutional provisions is at times half-hearted and only an afterthought.110 
Having said the above, caveat or no caveat, the Constitution has opened 
the door to direct horizontal application, even though the caveat sounded in 
section 8(2) needs to be heeded. 
The Act bears evidence of its attempt to align its provisions to the normative 
framework of the Constitution and in the light of the purpose to promote 
compliance with the Bill of Rights in the application of company law.111 In 
some instances, the Act permits the direct application of the provisions of 
the Bill of Rights to promote the realisation and enjoyment of the rights which 
it has established. A good example is to be found in the rights of certain 
individuals such as beneficial interest holders to access company records112 
for the purposes of exercising their rights. Section 26, for example, clearly 
links the right to access to information to a relevant constitutionally 
                                                 
107  Moseneke 2009 Stell LR 8. 
108  As provided in s 8(1) of the Constitution. 
109  See s 8(2) of the Constitution. 
110  Moseneke 2009 Stell LR 13. 
111  See s 7(a) of the Act. 
112  See s 26(1) of the Act. 
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guaranteed right, and this is buttressed by reference to the legislation 
promulgated to give effect to this right.113  
While it may be axiomatic from the provisions of the Act that the direct 
horizontal application of the Bill of Rights to the provisions of the Act is 
possible, whether or not the direct horizontal application of the Bill of Rights 
to company law is possible may not be as clear. It requires some 
interpretation to arrive at the correct answer. It can be argued in this regard 
that the call in section 7(a) to promote compliance with the Bill of Rights in 
the application of company law opens the door for the possible direct 
horizontal application of the Bill of Rights to common law. The Khumalo v 
Holomisa case is fitting authority to support the direct application of a 
provision of the Bill of Rights to a common law rule in the context of company 
law.114 Thus, for example, if the enjoyment of a fundamental right under the 
Bill of Rights is frustrated by a common law rule which directly impinges on 
such a right, then a claim or remedy should be founded on a relevant 
fundamental right in the Bill of Rights. As per the constitutionally sound 
precedent in Khumalo v Holomisa a court should allow the direct application 
of a provision of the Bill of Rights to a common law rule.  
4.2.2 Indirect horizontal application and the courts' duty to develop the 
common law  
In private disputes where a common law rule or statute is challenged for the 
alleged infringement of an affected party's fundamental right, courts have 
interpreted the statute or developed the common law in a manner that 
advances the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights.115 In other 
words, courts have sought to interpret the statute or develop the common 
law in a manner which advances values such as human dignity, equality 
and freedom.116 After the ground-breaking case of Khumalo v Holomisa, 
Moseneke pointed out that courts have retreated from the direct application 
of the Bill of Rights in a private sphere and now "resort to indirect 
horizontality facilitated by section 39(2)".117 In Barkhuizen v Napier118 
Ngcobo J stated that the preferred method of applying fundamental rights 
                                                 
113  Section 26(7) of the Act in this regard provides that: "The rights of access to 
information set out in this section are in addition to, and not in substitution for, any 
rights a person may have to access information in terms of – section 32 of the 
Constitution; the Promotion of Access to Information Act, 2000 (Act No. 2 of 2000) 
or any other public regulation." 
114  Khumalo v Holomisa 2002 5 SA 401 (CC) applied to a private dispute and is thus 
relevant to the direct horizontal application in a commercial law/company law 
context. 
115  As required by s 39(2) of the Constitution. 
116  Moseneke 2009 Stell LR 8. 
117  Moseneke 2009 Stell LR 8. 
118  Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 5 SA 323 (CC). 
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to constitutional challenges to contractual terms (private disputes) is the 
indirect horizontal application of the Bill of Rights achieved via the 
development of the common law.119 In regard to constitutional challenges in 
private disputes, the courts need to determine if a contractual term, a 
statutory provision or a common law rule challenged is contrary to public 
policy. Public policy is reflective of the fundamental and indeed the 
foundational values upon which the Constitution is founded. Thus public 
policy is in line with the normative value system which section 39(2) of the 
Constitution represents. In short, the indirect horizontal application of the 
Bill of Rights involves the development of the common law in order to 
improve the realisation and enjoyment of rights. 
The Act recognises the importance of the indirect horizontal application of 
the Bill of Rights in order to constitutionalise the common law in the 
company law context. For this reason, the Act has imposed a duty on the 
courts to develop the common law. The duty is relevant where the said 
development is necessary to facilitate, improve or promote the realisation 
and enjoyment of the rights established by the Act. The exact words used 
by the Act are as follows: 
When determining a matter brought before it in terms of this Act, or making an 
order contemplated in this Act –  
(a) a court must develop the common law as necessary to improve the 
realisation and enjoyment of rights established by this Act.120  
It is important to note that the duty imposed by the Act is reminiscent of the 
section 39(2) duty on courts. For ease of comparison with section 158(a) of 
the Act, section 39(2) provides that: 
When interpreting any legislation, and when developing the common law or 
customary law, every court, tribunal or forum must promote the spirit, purport  
and objects of the Bill of Rights.  
It is to be noted that section 158(a) imposes a duty only on courts, and not 
on any other adjudicating forums to develop the common law during the 
adjudicating process whenever it is found that the common law is deficient 
to facilitate the realisation and enjoyment of the rights established by the 
Act. This duty to develop the common law does not fall upon say a 
commission or a tribunal for the reason that these other forums do not have 
the inherent power to develop common law. The Constitution recognises 
                                                 
119  Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 5 SA 323 (CC) paras 23-30. 
120  See s 158(a) of the Act. The underlining of the word "must" is my own addition and 
it is for the purposes of emphasis only. 
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only the Constitutional Court, the SCA and the high courts as adjudicating 
forums with competence to develop the common law.121  
Case law holds that the Constitution imposes a general mandate on courts 
to develop the common law. In Carmichele v Minister of Safety and Security 
the court stated that this obligation is relevant "where the common law as it 
stands is deficient in promoting the section 39(2) objectives."122 The 
mandate is said to be peremptory. It "is not purely discretionary" and is 
"implicit in section 39(2) read together with section 173."123 Other than 
through section 39(2) and section 173, courts' duty to develop the common 
law is also evident in section 8(3) of the Constitution.124 The peremptory 
nature of the duty to develop the common law is evident in use of the word 
"must", especially in sections 8(3), and it is also implied in 39(2) and 173 of 
the Constitution. In section 158 (a) of the Act the word "must" is also used 
with reference to courts' duty to "develop the common law as necessary to 
improve the realisation and enjoyment of rights established by this Act". 
When fulfilling the mandate or obligation to develop the common law, courts 
of law do not have to wait for a perfect opportunity or a moment when "some 
startling development of the common law is in issue, but in all cases where 
the incremental development of a common law rule is in issue."125 It is even 
said that the obligation is of such a nature that the court may, in exceptional 
circumstances I suppose, intervene of its own accord if it recognises the 
need to develop the common law in the interests of justice, without having 
to wait for litigants.126 This is how serious the obligation to develop the 
common law is, as conveyed by case law. Thus, it is evident, even absent 
section 158(a) of the Act, that courts have the duty to develop the common 
law where the common law rule is deficient in promoting the spirit, purport 
and objects of the Bill of Rights. Does this in any way then make section 
158(a) superfluous? By no means! The fact that the Act has its own 
                                                 
121  Section 173 of the Constitution provides that: "The Constitutional Court, Supreme 
Court of Appeal and High Courts have the inherent power to protect and regulate 
their own process, and to develop the common law, taking into account the interests 
of justice". 
122  Carmichele v Minister of Safety and Security (Centre for Applied Legal Studies 
Intervening) 2001 4 SA 938 (CC) paras 54-56. 
123  Carmichele v Minister of Safety and Security (Centre for Applied Legal Studies 
Intervening) 2001 4 SA 938 (CC) para 39. 
124  Section 8(3) of the Constitution provides that: "When applying a provision of the Bill 
of Rights to a natural or juristic person in terms of subsection (2), a court – in order 
to give effect to a right in the Bill of Rights, must apply, or if necessary develop, the 
common law to the extent that legislation does not give effect to that right; and (b) 
may develop rules of the common law to limit the right, provided that the limitation is 
in accordance with section 36(1)." 
125  See K v Minister of Safety and Security 2005 6 SA 419 (CC) para 17. 
126  Carmichele v Minister of Safety and Security (Centre for Applied Legal Studies 
Intervening) 2001 4 SA 938 (CC) para 39. 
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provision which further imposes a duty on courts to develop the common 
law where necessary to promote the enjoyment and realisation of the rights 
established by the Act is evidence of how seriously the Act takes the matter 
of alignment with the normative value system of the Bill of Rights. The 
seriousness of the matter of the indirect horizontal application of the Bill of 
Rights to the provisions of the Act cannot be underestimated. This serves 
as additional emphasis of courts' duty to develop the common law by 
adapting, modifying or supplementing its rules where necessary to fill a gap 
in the law so as to promote the realisation of rights through their 
adjudication.  
In a nutshell, through section 158 the Act permits and promotes the indirect 
horizontal application of the Bill of Rights to its provisions. Indirect 
horizontality is best achieved through the development of the common law 
primarily via the section 39(2) mechanism and as permitted under the Act, 
by section 158 read together with section 7(a). The development of the 
common law is vital for producing an incremental and cohesive body of 
constitutionalised common law as is the apparent mission of the Act.127  
5 Conclusion 
The South African Constitution declares itself to be the supreme law of the 
land,128 and for that reason, it sets normative standards with which all 
conduct, decision-making, and law should comply, and the obligations it 
imposes must be fulfilled. The Constitution provides a normative framework 
for the interpretation of statutes through section 39(2), as established in this 
article.129 The main question this article set out to answer is: what are the 
implications of the normative framework for the interpretation and 
application of the Act? By ousting a rule by a sovereign parliament, the 
Constitution negotiated a shift from apartheid's culture of authority to a post-
apartheid culture of justification,130 where even judicial decisions have to be 
justified by reference to a cohesive set of values. This article has 
established that this is a part of transformative constitutionalism which 
demands that even commercial law principles should no longer be blindly 
accepted simply because precedent says so, or for the reason that it is 
expedient to do so for the purposes of commercial certainty. The impact of 
the normative framework on the Act is seen in the manner in which the Act 
was drafted. It appears that the drafters were mindful of the Bill of Rights 
when they drafted the Act. The Act reveals evidence of its intentional 
                                                 
127  As seen through the window of s 158(a) as read together with s 7(a) of the Act.  
128  See s 2 of the Constitution.  
129  As established in section 3.1, to "promote the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of 
Rights" refers to developing the common law in a manner that advances foundational 
values such as human dignity, equality and freedom.  
130  Mureinik 1994 SAJHR 32. 
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alignment to what has been termed a generic normative framework based 
on the section 39(2) objectives.131 It also reveals a subordinate normative 
framework,132 specific to the Act, based on section 158(b) of the Act,133 
whose approach to interpretation has been described in this article as being 
a purposive or text-in-context approach.134 
This article has showcased evidence of the Act's alignment with the 
normative value system. Firstly, the article explored the remedies to 
facilitate the realisation and enjoyment of the rights established by the 
Act.135 Secondly, it has been demonstrated that the Act permits the direct 
horizontal application of the Bill of Rights on the provisions of the Act in two 
ways, namely through a possible invocation of a provision of the Bill of 
Rights and through the direct application of a provision of the Bill of Rights 
to a common law rule.136 Thirdly, it has been argued and demonstrated that 
the Act permits the indirect horizontal application of the Bill of Rights through 
mandating courts to develop the common law where the common law, as it 
stands, is deficient in promoting the section 39(2) objectives.137 The Act 
requires courts to develop the common law in a manner that advances the 
foundational values of the Constitution such as human dignity, equality and 
freedom.138 A point has been made that the development of common law is 
vital to producing an incremental and cohesive body of constitutionalised 
common law in the company law context.139 
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